A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State Action by Callies, David
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Thu Feb 13 18:26:29 2020
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
			                                                                
David L. Callies, A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State Action,
57 Planning & Envtl. L. 10 (2005).                                                   
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
David L. Callies, A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State Action,
57 Planning & Envtl. L. 10 (2005).                                                   
APA 6th ed.                                                                          
Callies, D. L. (2005). federal requiem for public use: And blueprint for state
action. Planning & Environmental Law, 57(9), 10-11.                                  
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
David L. Callies, "A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State
Action," Planning & Environmental Law 57, no. 9 (September 2005): 10-11              
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
David L Callies, "A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State Action"
(2005) 57:9 Planning & Environmental L 10.                                           
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Callies, David L. "A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State
Action." Planning & Environmental Law, vol. 57, no. 9, September 2005, p. 10-11.
HeinOnline.                                                                          
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
David L Callies, 'A Federal Requiem for Public Use: And a Blueprint for State Action'
(2005) 57 Planning & Envtl L 10
Provided by: 
William S. Richardson School of Law
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
American Planning Association
Planning & Environmental Law
A better reform idea would be to require more complete September 2005 Vol. 57, 
No. 9 | p.10
compensation for persons whose property is taken by eminent
domain.
poses. It will also provide a marina, a
public walkway along the Thames
River, a site for the Coast Guard
museum, and public parking facilities
for the museum and a nearby state
park. So if we ban eminent domain for
projects designed solely for economic
development, this would quite likely
not cover the New London
Redevelopment project and any num-
ber of similar projects.
The prohibitory approach, even if we
could solve the definitional dilemmas, also
requires that there be someone to enforce
the ban. Do the sponsors intend to create a
new federal cause of action permitting
eminent domain opponents to take local
officials to federal court for a ruling on
whether their projects are permissible? Do
we really want federal judges deciding
whether local development projects should
be allowed to go forward or not?
And where are the lawyers going to
come from to represent the landowners who
object to their property being taken for eco-
nomic development? Property owners cur-
rently rely on lawyers who work for a per-
centage of any additional compensation
they obtain for the owners. These lawyers
have a strong incentive to argue that their
clients are entitled to more money, since
that will automatically increase their fees.
But their incentives to argue that the taking
is prohibited are obviously more problem-
atic; if they push too hard and the argument
actually prevails, there may be no money to
pay their fees.
A better reform idea would be to
require more complete compensation for
persons whose property is taken by emi-
nent domain. The constitutional standard
requires fair market value, no more and
no less. Congress modified this when it
passed the Uniform Relocation Act in
1970, which requires some additional
compensation for moving expenses and
loss of personal property. Congress could
modify the Relocation Act again, in order
to nudge the compensation formula fur-
ther in the direction of providing truly
"just" compensation.
For example, Congress could require
that when occupied homes, businesses or
farms are taken, the owner is entitled to a
percentage bonus above fair market
value, equal to one percentage point for
each year the owner has continuously
occupied the property. This would pro-
vide significant additional compensation
for the Susette Kelos and Wilhelmina
Derys who are removed from homes they
have lived in for much of their lives.
Alternatively, Congress could require
that when a condemnation produces a gain
in the underlying land values due to the
assembly of multiple parcels, some part of
this assembly gain has to be shared with
the people whose property is taken. Under
current law, all of the assembly gain goes to
the condemning authority, or the entity to
which the property is transferred after the
condemnation.
Either one of these adjustments in the
measure of just compensation-or others
that might be advanced if Congress held
serious hearings on the matter-would do
more to protect homeowners against emi-
nent domain than declaring a federal pro-
hibition on takings for economic develop-
ment. Adjustments in compensation
would protect all property owners-those
whose property is taken for highways and
public housing projects, as well as those
whose property is taken for economic
development projects. Such a require-
ment would be vigorously enforced by
the attorneys who represent property
owners in condemnation proceedings.
Providing additional compensation in
cases of greatest concern would discour-
age local governments from using emi-
nent domain in these cases, without pro-
hibiting its use altogether. Perhaps most
importantly, assuring a more "just" meas-
ure of compensation would leave the ulti-
mate decision about when to exercise this
power in the hands of local elected offi-
cials, where it has long been lodged, and
where it belongs.
A Federal Requiem for Public Use:
and a Blueprint for State Action
By David L. Callies, FAICP
A bare majority of the Kelo Court
upheld the exercise of eminent domain
for the purpose of economic revitaliza-
tion. Heavily relying on its previous
decisions in Berman and Midkiff, the
Court stated it was too late in the game
to revisit its present expansive view of
public use. There is no difference in
modern eminent domain practice
between public use and public purpose,
Callies is the Benjamin A. Kudo Professor of Law, University
of Hawail, the William S. Richardson School of Law. He filed
an amicus curiae brief an behalf of 13 law professors in sup-
port of the property owners. He can be reached at
dcallies@hawaii.edu.
at least in federal court. Indeed, the
Court, by a narrow 5-4 vote, specifically
equated public use and public purpose
before holding that condemning land
for economic revitalization was simply
another small step along the continuum
of permitting public benefits to be suffi-
cient indicia of meeting public use/pub-
lic purpose requirements. As the Court
also noted, it is now up to the states to
decide whether or not to increase the
burden on the government's exercise of
compulsory purchase powers. The fed-
eral bar is presently set so low as to be
little more than a speed bump.
The Court bluntly rejected any sugges-
tion that it formulate a more rigorous test.
To require government to show that public
benefits would actually accrue with reason-
able certainty or that the implementation
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much good in terms of public welfare and public benefits
flowing from economic revitalization under such a relaxed
standard, as they have often done in the past.
of a development plan would actually
occur would take the Court into factual
inquiries already rejected earlier in the
term when the Court rejected the "sub-
stantially advances a legitimate state inter-
est" test for regulatory takings in Lingle. In
a nod to federalism and states' rights, the
Court closed by leaving to the states any
remedy for such hardships posed by the
condemnations in New London.
Only Justice Kennedy's concurrence
suggests some small role remains for
federal courts in determining that a par-
ticular exercise of eminent domain
might fall short of the required public
use requirement: "There may be pri-
vate transfers in which the risk of unde-
tected impermissible favoritism of pri-
vate parties is so acute that a
presumption (rebuttable or otherwise)
of invalidity is warranted under the
Public Use Clause."
The argument for a judicial hands-off
is not so strong as the Court's majority
suggests, however. Justice O'Connor,
who wrote the broadly worded Midkiff
opinion for a unanimous Court in 1984,
observed that the question of what is a
public use is a judicial, not a legislative
one. If economic development takings
meet the public use requirement, there is
no longer any distinction between private
and public use of property, the effect of
which is "to delete the words 'for public
use' from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment."
There was very little left of the public
use clause-at least in federal court-
even before the Kelo decision. While a
growing handful of state decisions (and
federal decisions applying state law on
property) found economic revitalization
public purposes invalid on constitutional
grounds, an equal number of decisions
agreed with the Connecticut Supreme
Court that this was a valid public use.
Clearly, this is also the view of hundreds
of state and local revitalization and rede-
velopment agencies.
Whether one reads the Court's previ-
ous jurisprudence on public use broadly,
as Justice Stevens does for the Court's
majority, or more narrowly, as does the
dissent, it is difficult to argue with the
conclusions reached separately by Justice
O'Connor: The public use clause is virtu-
ally eliminated in federal court. What
yellow light of caution the handful of
recent cases signalled has now turned
back to green, and the government may
once more acquire private property by
eminent domain on the slightest of pub-
lic purpose pretexts unless such a use is
inconceivable or involves an impossibil-
ity, the tests following Midkiff in 1984. In
other words, it's now all about process,
and process only.
There is no doubt that state and
local governments will do much good in
terms of public welfare and public ben-
efits flowing from economic revitaliza-
tion under such a relaxed standard, as
they have often done in the past. And
yet, the public use clause is more than
simple policy; it is a bedrock principle
contained in the Bill of Rights amend-
ments to our federal constitution,
designed not to further the goals and
desires of the majority, but as a shield
against majoritarian excesses at the
expense of an otherwise defenseless
minority-like the Kelos. Surely we
could have found grounds to preserve
that shield in federal court.
Debunking the Urban (Planning)
Legends About Kelo
By John M. Baker
In Kelo, the petitioners asked the
Supreme Court to do something it had
never done before-strike "economic
development" and "tax base enhance-
ment" from the set of "conceivable pub-
lic purposes." The property owners didn't
seriously dispute that those were valid
governmental objectives, or that con-
demning property can rationally further
those goals. They wanted those objec-
tives stricken from the list of "public pur-
poses" so that property owners would win
more often. It was an effort at revolution-
ary change that nearly succeeded.
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If you rely upon headlines, AM radio,
and op-ed pieces for your news about
our highest court, you should be
stunned to learn the following. More
than 50 years ago in Berman v. Parker,
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously
recognized that judges are particularly
unsuited to tell public officials what is
and is not a public purpose, and what
use of eminent domain does or does not
further such a purpose. In Berman, as in
Kelo, the government took property that
belonged to one private party, con-
demned it, and sold it to another private
party. As in Kelo, the plaintiff's property
in Berman was not blighted, but the sur-
rounding area was. Yet the U.S.
Constitution did not prohibit the gov-
ernment from deciding to purchase the
property through eminent domain, so
long as it paid its owner just compensa-
tion and provided the owner with due
process.
Thirty years later, in another unani-
mous ruling in Hawaii Housing Authority
v. Midkiff, the U.S. Supreme Court again
held that the "public use" requirement
does not prevent governments from con-
